VPN Server Seizure

Dutch Police Seize Windscribe VPN Server – What It Means for Your Privacy

By DoVPN Research Desk Published: February 7, 2026 ~15 min read

Dutch police have physically seized one of Windscribe VPN's servers in the Netherlands as part of an ongoing investigation. The company says officers turned up without presenting a warrant, removed a single VPN node from a rack, and told Windscribe it would be returned after a "full analysis."

Windscribe claims the seizure should not expose any identifiable user data because its infrastructure runs on RAM-only, no-logs servers – meaning investigators who pull the plug should find little more than a stock Ubuntu install. At the time of writing, Dutch law enforcement has not publicly commented or confirmed the details of the operation.

This incident is not the first time Dutch authorities have gone after privacy infrastructure. In 2016, police seized Perfect Privacy VPN servers in Rotterdam and shut down the Ennetcom encrypted phone network used by thousands of customers, many linked to organized crime. Together, those cases – plus the 2023 Mullvad VPN raid in Sweden – give a rare, real-world look at how "no-logs" and "RAM-only" claims hold up when police show up with subpoenas and search warrants.

If you need a refresher on what a VPN can and cannot protect, start with our complete guide to VPNs.

Quick summary – Windscribe's Dutch server seizure in context

• What happened: Windscribe says Dutch police seized a single VPN server in the Netherlands, allegedly without showing a warrant on site, and said it would be returned after a full forensic analysis.
• Why it matters: The server is part of a commercial VPN network used to route user traffic. Physical access to such a node is one of the few ways investigators might try to bypass a VPN's "no-logs" stance and look directly for traces of activity on hardware.
• Windscribe's technical defence: Windscribe says the node ran a RAM-disk operating system and that it keeps no identifying logs, so pulling power wipes volatile memory and leaves nothing useful beyond a basic OS image. The company points to its transparency report, which claims it has never complied with a law-enforcement data request due to lack of relevant data.
• Precedent in the Netherlands:
  • Perfect Privacy (2016) – Dutch police seized two VPN servers in Rotterdam via the hosting provider; the VPN said that because it kept no logs, no user data was compromised and replacement servers were online the next day.
  • Ennetcom (2016) – Dutch and Canadian authorities seized Ennetcom's encrypted phone servers, copied their contents, and used the data in serious organized-crime cases, showing what happens when an encrypted service does retain valuable metadata or keys.
• Other no-logs tests: In 2023, Swedish police arrived at Mullvad VPN's office with a search warrant intending to seize systems with customer data but left empty-handed after Mullvad demonstrated that such logs simply didn't exist.

Timeline: how the Windscribe server seizure unfolded

1. Windscribe's public statement

On 5 February 2026, Windscribe posted publicly that Dutch authorities had just removed one of its VPN servers from a rack in the Netherlands to "fully analyze it," saying they would return it afterward.

Key points from Windscribe's statements:

• Windscribe alleges that officers did not present a warrant on site.
• The seized machine was described as a regular VPN node in a Dutch data centre.
• Windscribe wrote that it uses RAM-disk servers, so investigators would only find a fresh Ubuntu install on disk, not databases of user activity.
• In a follow-up post, the company said it normally receives a handful of law-enforcement requests each month and replies that it has no logs; this time, they say, authorities "just snatched the server from the rack to look for the logs themselves."

2. Community and industry response

Privacy and security accounts quickly summarized that Dutch authorities seized a Windscribe server as part of an undisclosed investigation, stressing that Windscribe's "privacy-focused design thwarted any data recovery efforts."

Security researcher John Scott-Railton from Citizen Lab warned that RAM-only is not a silver bullet, because law enforcement can use "hot-plug" techniques to capture memory without cutting power.

Community discussions raised two main themes: some users said they would never accept such hardware back, considering it permanently compromised; others questioned the legal scenario, arguing Dutch authorities typically do act under some form of judicial authority.

At the time of writing, Dutch police have not published a public explanation or warrant, so critical details remain unverified, including exactly which authority ordered the seizure, the legal basis used, and whether the server was live or powered off when removed.

Why RAM-only and no-logs matter when a VPN server is seized

Windscribe's core argument is straightforward: "We don't log, and our servers run from RAM, so seizing hardware yields nothing useful." To understand how realistic that is, it helps to unpack both pieces.

No-logs VPN policies in practice

A no-logs VPN aims not to retain:

• Source IP addresses
• Connection timestamps
• Traffic destinations (sites, IPs, DNS queries)
• Bandwidth usage per user

Without those, investigators who obtain database access or configuration files should be unable to retroactively tie an IP or session to a specific account.

However, some VPNs with weak policies or deceptive marketing have, in the past, logged more than they admitted, which then surfaced in court. A good no-logs policy must be backed by architecture (centralised logging disabled, ephemeral identifiers, minimised metadata) and ideally independent audits or real-world tests – such as Mullvad's and now Windscribe's experiences.

Windscribe claims a strict no-logs policy and publishes a real-time transparency report showing that data requests are logged but not satisfied because the data does not exist.

RAM-only servers vs. traditional disk-based nodes

RAM-only (or "diskless") servers are designed so that:

• The operating system and VPN daemon boots from an image into RAM.
• Configuration, keys and runtime data remain in volatile memory.
• If power is cut, RAM quickly loses its contents, and there is no local disk with historical logs to be imaged.

Many leading VPNs (e.g. ExpressVPN, NordVPN) have transitioned large parts of their fleets to RAM-only architectures for precisely this reason. Others, like Proton VPN, use full-disk encryption with keys stored off-server, arguing that a powered-off, encrypted disk is essentially as useless to investigators as a RAM-only box.

The caveat: live acquisition and "hot-plug" techniques

Researchers quickly pointed out that RAM-only is not magic armour.

• In forensic practice, investigators sometimes keep a seized server powered or use a "hot-plug" to maintain memory state long enough to perform a live RAM capture in a controlled environment.
• If done correctly, this can snapshot encryption keys, connection metadata, and potentially fragments of traffic sitting in memory at that exact moment.

Whether that meaningfully deanonymises users depends heavily on timing (was the node actively handling the target's traffic?), software design (are keys per-session and ephemeral?), and additional logs on control planes.

In other words: RAM-only drastically reduces the forensic value of an unplugged, powered-off server, but it does not guarantee zero risk if police can capture memory while the system is live.

Dutch precedent: Perfect Privacy, Ennetcom and how this compares

The Netherlands has already been at the centre of several major actions against privacy infrastructure. They show how different technical and business models fare under real pressure.

Perfect Privacy (2016): two VPN servers seized in Rotterdam

In 2016, Dutch police seized two Perfect Privacy VPN servers in Rotterdam as part of an investigation, going directly to the hosting provider with a subpoena.

• Perfect Privacy said it was not contacted directly by law enforcement, learning of the seizure only via the host.
• The provider assured customers that no user data was compromised, citing its strict no-logs policy.
• Replacement servers were provisioned quickly, and downtime was minimal.

This incident is strikingly similar to the Windscribe case: same jurisdiction (Netherlands), same kind of infrastructure (leased servers), authorities bypassed the VPN company and worked through the data-centre host, and the VPN's no-logs design meant that seizing hardware did not reveal user browsing histories.

Ennetcom (2016): encrypted phone network effectively dismantled

Also in 2016, Dutch police, working with Canadian authorities, seized servers belonging to Ennetcom, an encrypted communications provider whose customized BlackBerry handsets were widely used by criminal groups.

• Ennetcom sold locked-down phones with its own encrypted messaging service, using its servers as a central hub.
• Dutch prosecutors alleged the network was heavily used by organized crime, including in drug trafficking and contract killings.
• Authorities copied the contents of servers in both the Netherlands and Canada and used the data in multiple criminal investigations.

Lesson: A "secure" or "encrypted" service can still leak enormous amounts of data to law enforcement if the provider's architecture requires central logging or key control. A well-implemented no-logs VPN, in contrast, can make seized hardware far less valuable.

Mullvad (2023): raid with a warrant, no user data

In 2023, Swedish police arrived at Mullvad VPN's Gothenburg office with a search warrant, intending to seize computers with customer data.

• Mullvad's lawyers argued that no such data existed and that any seizure would be unlawful.
• After Mullvad demonstrated its no-logging design, police left without taking anything and without obtaining customer information.

Unlike Windscribe and Perfect Privacy, this was a raid on company premises rather than data-centre nodes, but the outcome reinforces the same point: if logs truly don't exist, even a valid warrant or seizure order cannot conjure them into being.

What does this mean if you use Windscribe – or any VPN?

From a user's perspective, the Windscribe case highlights several practical points about VPN trust and threat models.

1. Physical server seizures are a known and recurring risk

Perfect Privacy, Ennetcom, and now Windscribe show that law enforcement in countries like the Netherlands will not hesitate to seize VPN or encryption infrastructure when they believe it can advance an investigation. Providers that rely on third-party data-centres can be side-stepped; police can go directly to the host with a subpoena.

This isn't hypothetical anymore – it is normal operational reality for any commercial VPN.

2. A strong no-logs implementation is more important than ever

The difference between Ennetcom and providers like Perfect Privacy, Mullvad and (if claims hold) Windscribe is stark:

• When the service retains metadata or message contents, seized servers can become gold mines for prosecutors.
• When the service is engineered to have nothing useful to give, seizures mainly become jurisdictional skirmishes and PR events rather than privacy catastrophes.

When choosing a VPN, don't stop at the marketing page:

• Look for independent audits of no-logs claims.
• Check whether the provider has faced real-world legal tests (search warrants, subpoenas, raids) and how those ended.
• Read the privacy policy for specific statements about what is and is not logged, and for how long.

3. RAM-only or fully encrypted servers are now table stakes for serious privacy

Whether you prefer RAM-disk designs (Windscribe, ExpressVPN, NordVPN and others) or full-disk encryption with off-box keys (Proton VPN), the direction of travel is clear:

Plain, unencrypted disks in third-party data-centres are no longer acceptable for a "private" VPN service.

For advanced users and high-risk scenarios, supplement this by:

• Preferring providers that minimise their exposure in high-risk jurisdictions or use diskless "colocation" hardware they physically control.
• Considering self-hosted VPNs for some use cases, where you control both the OS and logging, as discussed in our Amnezia VPN self-hosting guide.

4. A VPN is not anonymity – especially if your own behaviour leaks identity

Even a top-tier VPN cannot guarantee anonymity on its own. You can still be identified via:

• Accounts tied to your real identity (email, banking, social media)
• Browser fingerprinting and tracking cookies
• DNS and IP leaks if your VPN/app is misconfigured or buggy

If you are in a higher-risk category (journalist, activist, whistleblower), you should combine a VPN with:

• Hardened browsers and privacy-respecting DNS – see our DNS leak guide.
• Regular IP leak testing to verify that your provider is not leaking your real address via IPv6, DNS or WebRTC.
• Threat-model-appropriate tools like Tor for some activities.

How to choose a VPN that can survive a server raid

If you're evaluating VPNs in light of the Windscribe news, focus less on clever marketing and more on engineering and legal posture.

1. Logging policy and audits

• Clear, specific privacy policy:
  • Acceptable: minimal aggregated metrics (total bandwidth per node, overall user counts) with no per-user identifiers.
  • Red flag: vague statements like "some connection data may be retained for quality purposes" without details.
• Independent audits of no-logs claims (policy and implementation), server configuration (diskless vs encrypted, access controls), and apps/infrastructure (code-level and penetration testing).

2. Infrastructure design

• RAM-only or full-disk-encrypted servers with keys stored off-box.
• Minimal reliance on locations with historically aggressive seizure practices unless the provider has proven its design there (e.g. Sweden for Mullvad, Netherlands for Perfect Privacy).
• Consider whether you need specialised features like multi-hop, obfuscation, or self-hosting to manage your own risk better – as discussed in our guide to unblocking websites with VPNs.

3. Jurisdiction and past legal tests

• Jurisdiction is not a magic shield, but it does shape the legal tools available to investigators.
• Look for: documented court cases, subpoenas or raids in which the VPN demonstrably had no useful data to hand over (Mullvad, Perfect Privacy); transparent law-enforcement guidelines or transparency reports that list how many data requests were received and how they were handled.

For a broader comparison of trustworthy VPNs – including those using RAM-only infrastructure and audited no-logs policies – see our continuously updated Best VPNs guide.

Practical steps for current Windscribe users

If you're already using Windscribe, here's a pragmatic checklist rather than a panic button:

1. Assume no immediate compromise

Based on currently available information, there is no evidence that Dutch authorities have obtained user-identifying logs from Windscribe as a result of this seizure.

2. Harden your setup anyway

• Run an IP leak test while connected to Windscribe.
• Ensure IPv6 leaks, DNS leaks and WebRTC leaks are mitigated on your platforms (see our OS-specific leak-fix guides for Windows, macOS, and iOS).

3. Watch for further disclosures

• Follow Windscribe's official channels for any technical post-mortem or legal update once they are allowed to speak more freely.
• Keep an eye on credible security reporting for evidence of data exposure or court filings.

4. Re-evaluate your provider mix for critical use-cases

For day-to-day streaming and basic privacy, Windscribe's current posture may be adequate. For higher-risk activities, consider splitting trust across multiple providers or combining a commercial VPN with a self-hosted solution.

FAQ: Windscribe Dutch server seizure and VPN privacy

If you want a deeper, law- and policy-focused view of how European proposals like EU Chat Control and new surveillance frameworks could further pressure VPNs and encryption services, see our analysis of EU Chat Control, ProtectEU and VPN logging risks.